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Abstract 
The need for education systems and schools to improve and innovate has become central to the education 
policy of governments across the world according to Gray (2014). School inspections are expected to play 
an important role in promoting such continuous improvement and to help schools and education systems 
more generally to consider the need for change and improvement. This paper aims to enhance our 
understanding of the connections between school inspections and their impact on school improvement, 
using a longitudinal survey to principals and teachers in primary and secondary education. Random 
effects models and a longitudinal path model suggest that school inspections particularly have an impact 
on principals, and not so much teachers. The results indicate that the actual impact on improved school 
and teaching conditions, and ultimately student achievement is limited. Schools in different inspection 
categories report of different mechanisms of potential impact; the lack of any correlation between 
accepting feedback, setting expectations and stakeholder sensitivity and improvement actions in the 
schools suggests that impact of school inspections is not a linear process, but operates through diffuse and 
cyclical processes of change. 
 
 
Introduction 
The need for education systems and schools to improve and innovate has become central to the education 
policy of governments across the world according to Gray (2014). The Bratislava memorandum of SICI, 
the European Association of Inspectorates of Education, specifies that school inspections are expected to 
play an important role in promoting such continuous improvement and to help schools and education 
systems more generally to consider the need for change and improvement1. As the memorandum outlines, 
the relationship between inspection and innovation is complex and the role of inspections in raising 
quality and standards of achievement has been discussed on many occasions.  
 
Recently, a number of comparative studies such as Governing by Inspection (Grek et al., 2013), the 
Impact of School Inspections on Teaching and Learning project (Ehren et al., 2013) and research by the 
OECD (Looney, 2009; OECD, 2013) and SICI (Gray, 2014) have been carried out to obtain a better 
understanding of the effectiveness of school inspection and its contribution to educational improvement in 
a number of different contexts and education systems. These and other studies (see Luginbuhl et al, 2009; 
Hussain, 2012; Allen and Burgess, 2012) indicate that school inspections can have a great impact on what 
students learn and how they learn. The standards Inspectorates use to assess educational quality and 
teaching and learning in schools during inspection visits, the sanctions for failing and underperforming 
schools and the rewards for highly effective and well-functioning schools stimulate and pressure schools 
to meet nationally defined targets and objectives. School inspections may however also lead to 
unintended negative consequences for teaching and learning in schools. Possible negative consequences 
have been categorized by De Wolf and Janssens (2007) as intended and unintended strategic behaviour of 
schools and teachers. These types of behaviours may negatively affect student achievement in schools. 
Rosenthal (2004) for example found a decrease in examination results of pupils in England in secondary 
education in the year of the inspection visit, and Shaw et al (2003) found that inspection did not improve 
examination achievement in maintained comprehensive schools. Other studies, such as by Matthews & 
Sammons (2004) who analysed results for all secondary schools in the year before the visit and two years 
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following on from the inspection however did not indicate such a dip in student achievement after 
inspections.  
 
 
 
These contradictory findings portray complex and varied links amongst elements of inspections, 
mechanisms of impact and school outcomes that make the study of the functioning of inspection systems 
complicated. Understanding the effects and the effectiveness of school inspections across different 
contexts entails detailed analysis of diverse contexts and schools systems, multiple system layers and 
interaction effects among approaches to school inspections that are currently implemented.  
 
This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the connections between school inspections and their 
impact on school improvement, and how such connections may be different for teachers, principals and 
primary and secondary schools. An attempt is made to unpack how these connections change over time as 
schools implement feedback from recent inspection visits, or start to prepare for upcoming visits. The 
focus of the paper is on the Inspectorate of Education in the Netherlands, and attempts to answer two 
questions: 
 
(1) What impact (school improvement and unintended consequences) do Dutch school inspections have 
on primary and secondary schools, according to principals and teachers?  
(2) Which intermediate processes/mechanisms (these include providing feedback/setting expectations/ 
stakeholders’ sensitivity to inspection reports) explain this impact, according to principals and teachers in 
Dutch primary and secondary education? 
 
The following section first explains how schools are inspected in the Netherlands. A brief literature 
review is then presented which reflects on the key mechanisms of impact of school inspections, and 
informs the theoretical framework of the study.  
 
School inspections in the Netherlands2 
The Dutch Inspectorate of Education, established in 1801, is one of the oldest operating Inspectorates in 
Europe. Its working methods, like those of other inspectorates, have evolved greatly over time, 
particularly in the last decade. At the time of the study (2010-2013), the Dutch Inspectorate of Education 
used a risk based inspection method to inspect schools in primary and secondary education 
 
This method included annual early warning analyses of potential risks of failing educational quality in all 
schools. In these analyses, student achievement results on standardized tests, self evaluation reports and 
financial reports of schools, complaints of parents and news items in the media were all used to identify 
potentially failing schools. Students’ results (corrected for their socio-economic backgrounds) on national 
standardized tests and examinations were the primary indicator in the analyses and were used to classify 
schools into one of three categories; schools in the ‘green’ category are considered to have no risks of 
failing, ‘orange’ schools have potential risks of failing, whereas ‘red’ schools have high risks of failing. 
 
Schools in the ‘green’ inspection category received a ‘basic’ inspection treatment which meant there was 
no further inspection activity in the school that year. The Inspectorate considered student results to be a 
good predictor of the educational quality of schools and expects quality of the teaching and school 
organisation to be adequate and not in need of an external evaluation.  
 
The Inspectorate of Education scheduled desk research on schools in the ‘orange’ category. These schools 
were requested to send in the student achievement results of students in intermediate grades in literacy 
                                                     
2 The following section was taken from <authors>) 
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and mathematics. The Inspectorate also analysed additional documents about the school, such as annual 
reports. In cases in which this desk research showed no risks (the documents are in order and student 
achievement results in intermediate grades are sufficient and there are no indications of risk); the school 
was reassigned to the ‘green’ category. The school board however received an informal warning in case 
the achievement of students in the final grade was below average or was declining. An interview with the 
school board was scheduled in cases in which the desk research pointed to potential risks. Potential risks 
were discussed during this interview, as well as the capacity of the school board to address and solve 
these risks. An additional inspection visit to the potentially failing school was arranged in the event that 
this interview did not provide the Inspectorate of Education with sufficient information or in cases in 
which the capacity of the school board to address the risks was evaluated as inadequate. During this visit, 
the inspection framework was used to assess educational quality in the school as ‘basic’, ‘weak’ or ‘very 
weak’.  
 
The Inspectorate of Education also undertook desk research of schools in the ‘red’ category, comparable 
to the desk research of schools in the ‘orange’ category. School boards of the ‘red’ category schools were 
interviewed and they received a full inspection visit to evaluate their educational quality on nine 
indicators which covered students’ results and educational processes in the school. During this visit, the 
inspection framework was again used to assess educational quality in the school as ‘basic’, ‘weak’ or 
‘very weak’. 
 
The Inspectorate of Education instructed the school board of a weak school to formulate a plan of action 
aimed at improving quality. The Inspectorate tested the plan and laid down performance agreements in an 
inspection plan. This plan specified when the quality should be up to par again and what (interim) results 
the school must attain. It also specified the indicators the Inspectorate of Education would assess in 
(interim) inspection visits to the failing school. The school board had to commit to the inspection plan. 
Weak schools that did not improve within two years ended up in the regime imposed on very weak 
schools. These schools were scheduled for a meeting between the school board and the Inspectorate 
management and an official warning was given. If these activities did not yield the result agreed upon, the 
Inspectorate reported the school to the Minister, along with a proposal for putting sanctions in place. On 
the basis of this report, the Minister could proceed to impose administrative and/or financial sanctions. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Two recent reviews (Klerks, 2013; Nelson and Ehren, 2014) summarize the impact of school inspections 
on improvement of schools, schools’ self-evaluations and ultimately student outcomes in maths and 
literacy, as well as unintended consequences of inspections. These reviews give a very mixed view on the 
ultimate outcomes of school inspections, and why they are causing changes in schools. The standards and 
thresholds used to assess schools during inspection visits and the sanctions and rewards deployed to 
improve schools seem to be the dominant aspects of school inspections affecting (both positive and 
negative) change in schools.  
 
Standards and threshold 
Hanushek and Raymond (2002) for example point to rational choice theory to describe how standards, the 
thresholds in performance targets and related sanctions and rewards may influence actions in schools. 
Standards present the details of what is expected of schools; they create boundaries or domains for 
attention with respect to educational quality. Some Inspectorates include a specific threshold or target in 
their framework to identify whether a school is failing or not. In the Netherlands, targets have been set to 
categorize schools as basic weak, or very weak. These standards and particularly the threshold to identify 
failing schools are expected to be important aspects of the impact of school inspections. Hanushek and 
Raymond (2002) describe how school officials in test-based accountability systems in the USA would 
select the action that they perceive to have the highest yield, given their planning horizon, budget and 
appetite for risk. These authors found failing schools in the USA on the brink of being sanctioned to make 
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dramatic improvements in the year after identification of these failures. Such improvements are likely to 
be highly strategic and focused on ‘quick fix’ measures. De Wolf and Janssens (2007) for example 
describe how schools concentrate on short term goals or focus on quantifiable phenomena in the 
inspection framework to meet standards in inspection frameworks, or refrain from innovating out of fear 
of not complying to the standards, particularly when the inspection standards remain the same for a long 
period of time, are used in a high stakes context and in an inflexible manner.  
 
Sanctions and rewards 
Some studies also suggest that sanctions and rewards have a positive effect on educational quality in 
schools. The operating assumption in these studies is that schools work harder to perform well when 
something valuable is to be gained or lost; information and feedback alone is seen as insufficient to 
motivate schools to perform to high standards (Malen, 1999; Elmore and Fuhrman, 2001; Nichols et al, 
2006). Schools may receive rewards for good performance (such as financial bonuses or awards) or may 
be sanctioned when assessed to be failing. Sanctions are for example naming and shaming of the school 
on the internet, providing pupils in the school with vouchers to transfer to another school or fines.  
 
Heubert and Hauser (1999) found a significant relationship between the level of incentives for schools 
and students and the extent to which the curriculum and teaching in schools change. Responses to 
inspection tend to be most focused and effective where funding is at stake or exposure is higher, 
according to Matthews and Sammons (2004). Formal sanctions, like forced reconstitution of consistently 
low performing schools, were more likely to promote responses than just embarrassment from grading 
schools and reporting results publicly. Sanctions raise awareness of the importance of the standards as 
well as force schools to comply with the standards. 
 
High stakes (test-based) accountability systems have however also been known to produce harmful 
consequences (Heubert and Hauser, 1999; Koretz, 2003; Stecher, 2001). Sanctions and rewards may 
discourage desirable behaviour or may stimulate unintended and undesirable behaviour. Kerr (1975) 
describes how organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do 
(or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded. The extent 
to which this occurs depends, according to Kerr (1975), on the perceived attractiveness of the rewards 
offered. According to Elmore and Fuhrman (2001), schools operating under severe sanctions as 
reconstitution and probation or special measures do not appear to be making fundamental changes in their 
core processes. Instead they seem to exercise considerable emphasis on short term strategic behaviour, 
such as excessive test preparation when attainment scores and public examination results are used to 
assess schools. Some of these schools may incorporate structural changes but few appear to be making 
extensive or deep efforts to rethink their instructional programmes or develop capacity. 
 
Feedback during inspection visits 
Theories on learning and improvement of schools point to the role of performance feedback in change in 
schools. During visits, inspectors assess educational quality of schools with respect to standards in a 
framework and give feedback on the strong and weak points of the performance on these standards. Some 
Inspectorates also give schools advice on how to improve. Inspection feedback is expected to lead to 
effects as schools are made aware of the standards they have to comply to and are provided with feedback 
and sometimes also support to meet these standards. 
 
Inspection visits are also important in preventing strategic behaviour in schools. During visits, inspectors 
may for example check the accuracy of information presented by the school or may explain to schools 
how to make genuine improvements to meet the standards. Inspectorates that make little use of inspection 
visits to assess schools (for example because of long cycles of school inspections or when using other 
methods to assess schools) are therefore expected to bring about less improvement and cause more 
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strategic behaviour than Inspectorates visiting schools, particularly when schools have a high stake in 
being assessed positively.  
 
Ehren, et al. (2013) highlight three hypothetical mechanisms to explain how school inspections lead to 
school improvement on the classroom and school organisational level:  
 Setting expectations and institutionalisation of norms;  
 Accepting and using feedback; 
 Sensitivity of stakeholders to inspection reports (voice, choice and exit). 
 
Ehren et al. (2013) describe how inspection standards are assumed to set expectations about good 
education for schools and their stakeholders. These authors describe how standards are set when schools 
take heed of the information included in inspection standards and procedures, reflect on it, process it and 
adapt their goals and their practices in such a way that they come closer to the desired image of schools 
communicated by the inspection. Similar processes are described by Segerholm (2011: 1) who also 
explains how:  
 
evaluative activities, and perhaps specifically if they are carried out systematically, regularly and 
comprehensively like school inspections, impact on our perception and understanding of 
ourselves and the surrounding world in particular ways that are expressed in the values 
permeating these activities.  
 
Standards are set when schools pay attention to the information included in inspection standards and 
procedures, reflect on it, process it and adapt their goals and their practical ways of working in such a way 
that they come closer to the standard image of schools portrayed by the inspection framework. 
 
Feedback from school inspections is situated at the interpersonal level (school inspector to principal 
and/or teacher), as well as within a more complex multi-level system of feedback in inspection reports to 
the school’s stakeholders and publication of summary inspection assessments to the wider public. 
Inspection feedback becomes relevant when it supports actors on various levels in providing ideas for 
improvement actions. A number of studies note that feedback following an inspection has a great impact 
on school improvement, particularly when the feedback is specific, frequent and adapted to the school 
context (Matthews and Sammons, 2005; Ehren and Visscher, 2008; McCrone et al., 2007, 2009; Nusche 
et al., 2011; Dedering and Muller, 2011; Dobbelaer et al, 2013). Brimblecombe, Shaw, and Ormston 
(1995) and Chapman (2001), for example, describe how teachers seem to regard oral and written 
feedback from school inspectors as an important stimulus for school improvement. They found that 
teachers value the feedback from school inspectors as an important impetus for school improvement 
activities, especially if given in a setting of trust instead of in a context of punishment. Standaert (2000) 
confirms these findings when describing how feedback given in a private setting and fitting with a 
school’s culture seems to have a particularly positive impact. Ouston, Fidler, and Earley (1997) point out 
that school inspections promote greater school improvement if the inspection report clearly details the 
areas in which the school has performed poorly. According to Matthews and Sammons (2004), clear and 
explicit reports and feedback to schools are effective in informing school improvement plans after school 
inspections. Ehren and Visscher (2008) emphasize that feedback in itself often does not lead to 
improvement, but models of operation where feedback is combined with unsatisfactory scores, specific 
improvement suggestions and inspection agreements on improvement do make a difference to school 
improvement. 
 
Most inspection models deliberately communicate inspection standards and reports to the school’s 
stakeholders (such as parents, local policymakers or school boards). They expect them to use these 
standards when voicing their opinion about schools, when choosing a school and motivating schools to 
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address weaknesses and improve. These actions of stakeholders are expected to reinforce inspection 
expectations and make it more likely that schools react to the inspection. Stakeholders may raise their 
‘voice’ in order to motivate schools to improve, or may retreat to the option of ‘choice’ or ‘exit’ where 
they choose to enter or move their child to a high performing school. ‘Choice’ and ‘exit’ are expected to 
exert pressure on schools to conform to inspection standards and results by virtue of competition and 
market pressure.  
 
Each of these three mechanisms operates at multiple levels within the overall system and in the 
relationship of the system to external stakeholders (e.g., community members, politicians, policymakers). 
This paper’s interest is in examining the extent to which these mechanisms produce school-level 
outcomes on the classroom and school organizational level and how these mechanisms change over time 
to produce positive outcomes.  
The following framework summarizes the paper’s assumptions. It outlines how school inspections, their 
criteria and procedures in general, the consequences of inspection assessments, and the feedback given 
during inspection visits are expected to enable schools and their stakeholders to align their views/beliefs 
and expectations of good education and good schools to the standards in the inspection framework, 
particularly with respect to those standards the school failed to meet during the latest inspection visit. 
Schools are expected to act on these views and expectations and use the inspection feedback when 
conducting self-evaluations and when taking improvement actions. Stakeholders should use the 
inspection standards, or rather the inspection assessment of the school’s functioning against these 
standards (as publicly reported), to take actions that will motivate the school to adapt their expectations 
and to improve. Self-evaluations by schools are expected to build their capacity to improve that will lead 
to more effective teaching and learning conditions. Likewise, improvement actions will (when 
successfully implemented) lead to more effective school and teaching conditions. These conditions are 
expected to result in high student achievement. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of intended effects of Dutch school inspections 
 
 
 
Methodology 
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A survey was completed by principals and teachers in Dutch primary and secondary schools in three 
subsequent years (September – December 2011, 2012 and 2013) to test this model and to identify the 
mechanisms linking school inspections to the improvement of schools.  
 
Data collection 
The online questionnaire to principals and teachers included questions on the intermediate mechanisms of 
inspection (setting expectations, accepting feedback, stakeholders’ sensitivity to reports) and the 
intermediate outcome variables (promoting/improving self-evaluations, taking improvement actions, 
improvement capacity, effective school and teaching conditions) in the theoretical framework. Items to 
measure the improvement capacity of schools and improvement actions were inspired by the Dutch 
School Improvement Questionnaire (see Geijsel et al., 2009). Items measuring effective school and 
teaching conditions were inspired by Scheerens (2009) and were adapted from the ICALT questionnaire 
which was developed by the Inspectorates of Education in several European countries to measure the 
quality of teaching and learning, using a shared framework of indicators. Questions on intermediate 
processes were inspired by the NfER survey ‘Evaluation of the impact of Section 5 inspections’ 
(McCrone et al, 2009). Principals scored items on the effective school and teaching conditions in their 
school and the intermediate processes on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’. Questions about improvement actions refer to actions the school has taken to develop its capacity 
to improve and specifically to enhance effective school and teaching conditions; questions are framed in 
terms of the amount of time principals have spent during the previous academic year to improve the 
school’s functioning in these areas (using a 5-point scale ranging from ‘much less time’ to ‘much more 
time’).  
Unintended consequences were measured in the survey via the responses to four items: 
Q46: I discourage teachers to experiment with new teaching methods that do not fit the scoring rubric of 
the Inspectorate 
Q47: School inspections have resulted in narrowing curriculum and instructional strategies in my school 
Q49: The latest documents/facts and figures we sent to the Inspectorate present a more positive picture of 
the quality of our school then how we are really doing 
Q50: Preparation for school inspection is mainly about putting protocols and procedures in writing that 
are in place in the school and gathering documents and data. 
 
Principals were asked all four questions in each year of the survey. Teachers were asked all four questions 
in at least one sweep of the survey, however only Question 46 and Question 47 were repeated in all three 
sweeps of the teacher survey.  
 
Confirmatory factor analysis was carried out for each latent variable/scale to assess fit. Model fit was 
deemed to be acceptable or good based on model fit indices (apart from the scale on unintended 
consequences), see for a full report <authors>. The table below provides a description of the scales. 
 
Table 1. Survey scales and examples of items 
 
Latent construct Example item Number 
of items 
Scale 
Setting expectations The inspection standards affect the evaluation 
and supervision of teachers. 
6 strongly 
agree (1) - 
strongly 
disagree 
(5) 
Stakeholders sensitive to 
reports 
The school’s Board of Management/ Boards 
of Governors is very aware of the contents of 
the school inspection report. 
3 
Accepting feedback The feedback received from the inspectors 
was useful. 
4 
  
8 
Promoting/improving self-
evaluation 
Compared to last academic year, I spent 
less/more time on the self-evaluation process 
as a whole. 
3 much less 
(1) - much 
more (5) 
Improvement in capacity 
building (items on teacher 
participation in decision 
making, teacher co-operation, 
transformational leadership) 
Compared to last academic year, I spent 
less/more time involving teachers in making 
decisions about using new teaching methods. 
8 
Improvement in school 
effectiveness (items on 
assessment of teachers/school, 
opportunity to learn, 
assessment of students, 
structured teaching) 
Compared to last academic year, I spent 
less/more time on improving the extent to 
which teachers make effective use of 
teaching time within lessons. 
10 much less 
(1) - much 
more (5) 
Capacity building Teachers collaborate in organizing and 
improving their teaching 
6 strongly 
agree (1) - 
strongly 
disagree 
(5) 
School effectiveness Students are provided with sufficient 
instruction time to reach their potential. 
5 
Unintended consequences School inspections have resulted in 
refocusing curriculum and teaching and 
learning strategies in my school 
5 
 
Sample 
A two stage sampling design was used to select primary and secondary schools and teachers. The 
sampling design builds from the categories the Inspectorate of Education uses to classify schools and 
assign them to different inspection treatments (basic, weak, very weak). Schools in these different 
categories are confronted with different inspection treatments (basic: no visit, weak and very weak: visits 
and increased monitoring) and they were expected to respond differently to the variables in the survey. 
The results from the early warning analysis in May 2011 were used to select schools from different 
inspection categories. 
 
Primary schools 
The sample included principals from 408 primary schools, and in each school three teachers from grades 
3, 5 and 8. These teachers face different stakes to implement changes in response to school inspections, as 
particularly students’ test scores in grade 8 are part of the inspection measures. Schools in the weak and 
very weak inspection treatment categories were over sampled to ensure sufficient response rates. Schools 
that have not been assigned to an inspection treatment or were not included in the early warning analysis 
due to failures in the information provided to the Inspectorate (595 schools in total) were excluded from 
the target sample. Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix provide an overview of the target sample and the 
response rates of each year of data collection of schools and teachers. Response rates are relatively low 
(particularly in year 1 and 3), but non response of both principals and teachers is similar across the 
different inspection categories. 
 
Secondary schools 
Secondary education commences at the age of 12 and includes different levels of education which are 
organized in different departments in one school, or in separate school(s) buildings: VMBO, HAVO, or 
VWO. Children enter a level based on the advice of their primary school and the results of the national 
standardized end of primary education (grade 8) test. VMBO lasts four years, from the age of twelve to 
sixteen and combines vocational training with teaching in reading, writing, mathematics, history, arts and 
sciences. HAVO (five years) and VWO (six years) offer general education leading to higher education. In 
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this study only the HAVO and VWO departments (548) were included in the selection of secondary 
schools; 40% of all students nationally are enrolled in HAVO and VWO. 
  
A two stage sampling design was also used to sample school principals and teachers in secondary 
education, using the results from the early warning analysis from the Inspectorate of Education in May 
2011. HAVO and VWO departments that were not included in the early warning analysis of the 
Inspectorate or had not been assigned to an inspection arrangement were considered out of scope. The 
target population of secondary schools was therefore set to 454 schools (including both a HAVO and 
VWO department). The target sample included almost all HAVO and VWO departments in three 
different inspection treatments to reach sufficient response rates. Due to the limited number of schools in 
the ‘very weak’ inspection category, all schools in this category were included in the sample.  
 
Teachers from the lower grades (year 1-3 in both HAVO and VWO) and from the final examination grade 
who teach Dutch language or Geography were included in the sample. Dutch language is considered to be 
a core and high stakes subject and teachers are required to teach towards nationally defined curriculum 
standards; such standards have not been set for Geography. The final examination grades are an important 
inspection measure of student achievement in secondary schools, and these teachers are therefore 
expected to perceive school inspections as higher stakes compared to their peers in the lower grades. 
 
Tables 1 and 3 in the appendix provide an overview of the target sample and the response rates of schools 
and teachers. Response rates for secondary schools in year 1 are very low (approximately 5% for both 
principals and teachers) and even lacking for schools and teachers in the ‘very weak’ inspection category. 
The results for secondary education should therefore be interpreted with great caution.  
 
Longitudinal sample 
We asked the same set of schools to respond to the same survey three times in a row to measure change in 
these schools as a result of being assigned to the basic, weak or very weak inspection category. There 
were 285 schools whereby a principal responded at least once to the survey and 317 schools whereby at 
least one teacher responded. However, there were only 16 (principal) – 18 (teacher) schools that 
responded in all three years consecutively. For the principal data set there were however responses from 
93 schools whereby the principal responded to at least two years of the survey. For the teacher data set 
there were 105 schools where teachers responded to at least two years of the survey. These patterns of 
response are highlighted in table 3 below. The column labelled ‘pattern’ refers to the years of data 
collection for which the school has a response, “1” refers to the school having a response within the year 
of data collection, and “.” refers to the school missing data for that year. By restricting the sample to the 
schools who responded to at least two years of the survey, we are able to make better estimates of what 
the schools’ responses might have been in the one year in which they did not respond. It is important to 
recognise that it is probable that schools who responded to more than one sweep of the survey, have 
differential characteristics to those who only responded to only one sweep of the survey. A comparison of 
the samples on different observable characteristics however indicated that despite the reduction in sample 
size, the two samples do not differ by great amounts on many of the observable characteristics (see 
<website>). However, there are more schools from small towns in the longitudinal sample and the schools 
in the longitudinal sample have fewer children living in poverty.   
 
Table 2. The pattern of missingness within the longitudinal principal and teacher samples 
 
Frequency Percent Pattern 
Principals 
36 38% 1 1 . 
33 36% . 1 1 
  
10 
16 17% 1 1 1 
8 9% 1 . 1 
93 100%   
Teachers 
39 37% . 1 1 
35 33% 1 1 . 
18 17% 1 1 1 
13 12% 1 . 1 
105 100%   
 
 
Data analysis 
Data analyses included three steps:  
1) Implementing random effect models to analyse changes in each of the variables in the survey 
according to inspection category of the school. This analysis indicates if ‘basic’ versus ‘weak/very 
weak’ schools respond differently when faced with different inspection assessments and treatments.  
2) A longitudinal path model in which we analyze how the variables affect each other over time 
according to our conceptual framework in figure 1. 
 
Principal and teacher responses are analysed separately as previous analyses suggested that teachers and 
principals gave systematically different answers to the survey. There are schools in which only teachers 
have responded and schools in which only the principal has responded. It was not possible to accurately 
identify teachers over time, therefore as we are interested in changes on the school and teaching level (and 
not so much in changes of individual teachers), we collapsed teacher responses to provide a single score 
representing the average teacher response for a school within a particular year. Also the analyses are 
conducted on the combined responses of primary schools and secondary schools, as the low response 
rates in secondary schools don’t allow us to measure change in secondary schools separately. Both types 
of schools are also inspected under the same framework and inspection methods, which suggests that the 
assumptions as outlined in our theoretical framework in figure 1 are the same for both types of schools.  
 
The analysis was conducted using Stata version 13 (StataCorp, 2013). Scale scores were constructed by 
performing factor analysis on the polychoric correlation matrices using the pairwise option. Scale scores 
were predicted using the regression method (DiStefano, Zhu and Mindrila, 2009; Thurstone, 1934).  
 
Step 1 
The analysis of the longitudinal data began with graphical representations of the descriptive statistics on 
the observed primary data. The overall changes over time were considered and these changes were 
separated by inspection category (very weak/weak/basic).  
 
Random effect models (also known as multilevel models) with GLS estimation were used to test changes 
over time and the interaction between inspection category and time. This approach provided the most 
flexibility with the small sample size and the small number of time points. Furthermore random effect 
models can alleviate problems with missing data through the use of maximum likelihood methods (Quene 
and van den Bergh, 2004). The random effect model takes into account the dependence of the 
observations. Another way to think about this is that time points are nested within schools. The analysis is 
conducted on the predicted scale scores.  
 
Due to the very small number of schools categorised as ‘very weak’ this category has been combined with 
the ‘weak’ category to create a binary variable of ‘inspection category’. A main effect of inspection 
category is included to test whether the initial values of the scales, the intercepts, are influenced by the 
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inspection category of the school. The interaction between time and inspection category is also included 
to test whether scores in the scales changed differentially for principals and teachers in schools in 
different inspection categories.  
 
Step 2 
Based on the conceptual framework presented in figure 1, a path model was estimated using the 
longitudinal data. It was expected that the scales ‘accepting feedback’, ‘setting expectations’ and 
‘stakeholder sensitivity’ in year one of the survey would go on to influence ‘improvement actions’ of the 
school including ‘promoting self-evaluations’, ‘improvements in school effectiveness’ and ‘improvements 
in capacity building’ in year 2. These improvement actions would then influence the scales of ‘capacity 
building’ and ‘school effectiveness’ in year 3. We fitted this model on the principal and teacher data 
separately, and calculated models with and without controls for the inspection category.  
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Results: testing changes over time for principals and teachers by inspection category 
This section describes the impact of the inspection category upon the responses of the principals and 
teachers to the scales within the survey over time.  
 
Setting expectations 
The results for the setting expectations scale are shown in figure 2. The results indicate that in between 
year 1 and year 2 of the survey, principals in the “basic” inspection category (year 1 estimate = 4.90, 
S.E=0.14: year 2 estimate =4.12, S.E=0.08) experienced significantly larger decreases in the setting 
expectations scale between year 1 and 2 than those in the 'weak/very weak' inspection category (year 1 
estimate = 4.65, S.E=0.15: year 2 estimate =4.39, S.E=0.12). However between year 2 and year 3 the 
different inspection categories follow a similar trajectory, as shown by the similarity of the slopes 
between year 2 and 3 in figure 2. These findings suggest that the categorization of schools in a basic or 
‘weak/very weak’ category leads to a stronger alignment of school and teaching processes to inspection 
standards in the year after the early warning analysis, but alignment seems to decline over time in all 
schools. In year 2, principals in schools in the ‘basic’ category score significantly lower on the ‘setting of 
expectations’ compared to schools in the ‘weak/very weak’ category. These results are somewhat 
different for teachers: teachers in schools that were in the 'weak/very weak' inspection category tended to 
report higher scores on the setting expectations scale on average in year 1 (instead of principals in year 2). 
 
Figure 2. Changes in setting expectations for principals in basic versus weak/very weak schools 
 
 
Accepting feedback 
The results for the ‘accepting feedback’ scale are shown in figure 3. In the first year of the survey, 
principals in the ‘weak/very weak’ inspection category (estimate =3.73, S.E=0.14) reported significantly 
lower scores on average for the ‘accepting feedback’ scale than principals in schools in the basic 
inspection category (estimate = 4.12, S.E= 0.12). There was also some evidence that between year 1 and 
year 2 there were differential changes in the ‘accepting feedback’ scores by inspection category: 
principals in the basic category tended to report slightly lower scores at year 2 compared to year 1 (year 2 
estimate =4.03, S.E=0.07), whereas in the ‘weak/very weak’ inspection category the average score 
increased (year 2 estimate = 4.05, S.E=0.11). Between year 2 and year 3 there are no differences between 
the groups, which is clearly depicted in figure 3. These findings suggest that, after an inspection visit, 
principals in the ‘weak/very weak’ inspection category initially do not accept the inspection feedback, but 
increasingly do so in the second year after the inspection visit. There is however no evidence that the 
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average teacher response to the accepting feedback scale varied over time by inspection category of the 
school.  
 
Figure 3. Changes in accepting feedback for principals in basic versus weak/very weak schools 
 
 
 
 
Actions of stakeholders 
The results for ‘stakeholder sensitivity’ are shown in figure 4. There was a significant interaction between 
changes in the ‘stakeholder sensitivity’ scale over time and the inspection category of the school 
(chi2(2)=8.52, p<0.05). Principals of schools in the ‘weak/very weak’ inspection category tended to 
report very similar scores on the ‘stakeholder sensitivity’ scale over time (year 1 estimate=4.05, 
S.E=0.12; year 2 estimate=3.95, S.E=0.09; year 3 estimate=3.94, S.E=0.17), as shown by the 
approximation of a straight line in figure 4. Whereas, on average, principals of schools in the ‘basic’ 
category reported a reduction in scores on this scale over time, particularly between year 1 and 2 (year 1 
estimate=4.45, S.E=0.11; year 2 estimate=3.81, S.E=0.06; year 3 estimate= 3.79, S.E=0.07). In year 1 the 
basic inspection group had significantly higher scores on average than the ‘weak/very weak’ inspection 
group. But, in year 2 and year 3 they tended to report lower scores on average than the ‘weak/very weak’ 
inspection group. These findings suggest that particularly stakeholders, such as parents and school boards 
in potentially high performing schools use the inspection assessment from the early warning analysis in or 
after the year of publication, but not anymore in subsequent years. There is however no evidence that the 
average teacher response to the stakeholder sensitivity scale varied over time by inspection category of 
the school.  
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Figure 4. Changes in stakeholder sensitivity for principals in basic versus weak/very weak schools 
 
 
 
 
 
Promoting self-evaluations 
The results for the ‘promoting self-evaluations’ scale are shown in figure 5. There was a significant 
interaction between changes in the ‘promoting self-evaluations’ scale over time and inspection category 
(chi2(2) =12.35, p<0.05). Principals in schools in the inspection category ‘basic’, tend to report lower 
scores for ‘improvement of self-evaluations’ between year 1 and year 2, and increasing scores between 
year 2 and year 3 (year 1 estimate=4.19, S.E=0.09; year 2 estimate=3.78, S.E=0.08; year 3 estimate=3.73, 
S.E=0.09). However the exact opposite pattern occurs for principals in schools in inspection category 
‘weak/very weak’ (year 1 estimate=3.79, S.E=0.16; year 2 estimate=4.16, S.E=0.12; year 3 
estimate=3.76, S.E=0.22). In year 1 and 2 the inspection categories have statistically significant 
differences in their responses to the ‘promoting self-evaluations’ scale, but by year 3 there are no longer 
differences by inspection category. These findings suggest that inspection visits in weak and very weak 
schools lead to additional actions of principals to improve the school’s self-evaluation, particularly in the 
first two years after the early warning analysis, while potentially high performing schools in the ‘basic’ 
inspection category have implemented/worked on their self-evaluations before or during the early 
warning analysis of the Inspectorate, and decrease their level of activity when the Inspectorate publishes 
the outcome of the early warning analysis and places them in the ‘basic’ category. We did not find any 
evidence that the average teacher response to the ‘improvement of self-evaluations’ scale varied over time 
by inspection category of the school.  
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Figure 5. Changes in promoting self-evaluations for principals in basic versus weak/very weak schools 
 
 
 
Improvements in capacity-building 
The results for the ‘improvements in capacity building’ scale are shown in figure 6. There is a borderline 
significant association between changes in principals’ scores on the ‘improvement in capacity building’ 
scale over time and the inspection category of the school (chi2(2)=5.02, p=0.081). At year 2 there is a 
significant difference in the scores, with principals in schools in inspection category ‘weak/very weak’ 
reporting higher scores on average than those in the ‘basic’ inspection category. There are no statistically 
significant differences at year 1 or year 3 of the survey. These findings suggest that principals particularly 
invest in cooperation between teachers, transformational leadership, or teachers’ participation in decision-
making in the year after an inspection visit. There is no evidence that the average teacher response to the 
improvements in capacity building scale varied over time by inspection category of the school.  
 
Figure 6. Changes in improvements in capacity-building for principals in basic/weak/very weak schools 
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School-effectiveness and capacity-building 
There is no evidence that principals responded differently over time to changes in the ‘improvements in 
school effectiveness’ or the ‘school effectiveness’ scale or ‘capacity-building’ scale, according to the 
inspection category of their school. Also, teachers’ responses did not vary over time by inspection 
category of the school on the ‘school effectiveness’ scale. Teachers in schools in the inspection category 
‘weak/very weak’ however reported on average higher scores on the ‘improvements in school 
effectiveness’ scale in year 1, compared to teachers in schools in the ‘basic’ inspection category. Also, 
teachers in schools in inspection category ‘weak/very weak’ tended to report decreases in ‘capacity 
building’ over time whereas teachers in schools in the ‘basic’ inspection category reported very similar 
scores to the ‘capacity building’ scale over time. 
 
Unintended consequences 
For principals there were no significant differences in responses to the questions on discouraging the use 
of new teaching methods, whether inspections lead to a narrowing of the curriculum, and whether school 
inspection are mainly about putting protocols and procedures in writing that are in place in the school and 
gathering documents and data.  There was also no evidence that principals in schools in different 
inspection categories responded differently to these items over time. With regard to the question on 
whether the documents being sent to the inspectorate presented a more positive picture of the school than 
was true, there was some evidence that principals in schools in different inspection categories responded 
differently at year 2 of the survey, with principals in schools in the basic inspection category more likely 
to disagree with the item (basic year 2 estimate = 1.93, S.E=0.10; weak/very weak year 2 estimate=3.00, 
S.E=0.72).  
 
Figure 7. Changes in unintended consequences for principals in basic/weak/very weak schools 
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There is a significant interaction between year of survey and inspection category for the average teachers’ 
responses to whether inspections result in a narrowing of the curriculum (chi2(2)=6.81, p<0.05). 
Responses of teachers in schools in the basic inspection category change very little over the three years of 
the survey (year 1 estimate=2.75, S.E=0.13; year 2 estimate=2.81, S.E=0.10; year 3 estimate = 2.89, 
S.E=0.11). Teachers in schools in the weak inspection category are more likely to disagree that 
inspections result in a narrowing of the curriculum in year 2 and 3 compared to teachers in schools in the 
basic inspection category (year 1 estimate=3.24, S.E=0.26; year 2 estimate=2.48, S.E=0.19: year 3 
estimate =2.35, S.E=0.33). There was however no evidence that teachers in schools in different inspection 
categories responded differently to the question of whether they were discouraged from using new 
teaching methods.  
 
Results: Longitudinal Path Models  
The section above provides an indication of when changes take place in relation to the timing of the 
placement of schools in the ‘basic’ versus ‘weak/very weak’ inspection category and how these changes 
are particularly reported by principals. In this section we will use the responses from principals to look at 
the change process over time, looking at how variables affect each other year on year. We fitted path 
models, taking into account our assumptions of temporal ordering in the relationship between variables to 
look at how variables are related and impact on one another, based on the assumptions of our conceptual 
framework. Cross sectional structural equation models have been fitted using data from the first and 
second years of the survey looking at these relationships at a single point in time (<authors>). Here, we 
extend these models to include the inspection categories and the presumed temporal ordering of the 
relationships. However the smaller sample size and the complexity of the model limits us to using path 
models rather than structural equation models. We will test if and how ‘setting expectations’, ‘accepting 
feedback’, ‘stakeholder sensitivity’ impact on ‘improving self-evaluations’ and ‘improving capacity-
building’, and how these two variables impact on the school’s capacity to improve and the effective 
school and teaching conditions.  
 
The results from the path model are shown in figure 7. The coefficients shown on the regression pathways 
are standardised coefficients which are standardised on the dependent and independent variables. Being 
categorised as 'weak/very weak' in the first year of the survey resulted in significantly higher scores 
(approximately 1/3 of a standard deviation) for improvements in capacity building in year 2. Being 
categorised as 'weak/very weak' in the second year of the survey was associated with higher scores 
(approximately 1/3 of a standard deviation) in the ‘capacity building’ scale. Being categorized as 
‘weak/very weak’ was also indirectly positively associated with ‘improvements in school effectiveness’ in 
year two through ‘improvements in self-evaluations’. Higher scores on ‘promoting self-evaluations’ are 
associated with higher scores on ‘improvements in school effectiveness’, a standard deviation increase on 
the ‘improving self-evaluations’ scale results in just over half a standard deviation increase in the 
‘improvements in school effectiveness’ scale. Also a standard deviation increase in the ‘improving self-
evaluations’ scale is associated with 0.4 of a standard deviation increase on the ‘improvements in capacity 
building’ scale. Higher scores in ‘improvements in capacity building’ in year 2 were associated with 
lower scores in ‘school effectiveness’ in year 3. ‘Capacity building’ is positively associated with ‘school 
effectiveness’ at year 3 with higher scores on reported ‘capacity building’ associated with higher scores 
on ‘school effectiveness’. There is an indirect negative association between ‘promoting self-evaluations’ 
in year 2 and ‘school effectiveness’ in year 3. The full list of coefficients are included in table 4-6 in the 
appendix.    
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Figure 8. Longitudinal path model principals. Standardised (X and Y standardisation) coefficients shown  
 
 
Figure notes; significant indirect effects shown with dashed line.  
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Conclusion and discussion 
This paper used a longitudinal survey to principals and teachers in primary and secondary schools to 
analyse how school inspections lead to change in schools. The results indicate how schools that receive 
different inspection treatments change differently over time, and how different mechanisms of change 
lead to improvement of school and teaching conditions. The analyses made use of a theoretical framework 
outlined by Ehren et al (2013), describing how school inspections, their criteria and procedures in general, 
the consequences of inspection assessments, and the feedback given during inspection visits enable 
schools and their stakeholders to align their views/beliefs and expectations of good education to the 
standards in the inspection framework, particularly with respect to those standards they failed to meet 
during the latest inspection visit. According to this model, schools are expected to act on these 
expectations and use the inspection feedback when conducting self-evaluations and when taking 
improvement actions. Stakeholders are also expected to use the inspection standards and report of the 
school’s functioning against these standards to take actions that will motivate the school to improve. Self-
evaluations by schools are expected to build their capacity to improve that will lead to more effective 
teaching and learning conditions. Similarly, improvement actions will (when successfully implemented) 
lead to more effective school and teaching conditions. These conditions are expected to result in high 
student achievement. 
 
This study is unique in using a longitudinal approach to study these changes from school inspections over 
time. Implementing random effects models and a longitudinal path model for principals and teachers 
separately allowed us to analyze how variables impact on each other on different (school organisation and 
teaching) levels over time. This approach is unique as it allows, for the first time in the study of school 
inspections, to look at mechanisms of impact and how change from school inspections comes about.  
The study however also has some limitations that need to be addressed, particularly in using self-reports 
of principals and teachers in analysing change, and in the low response rates on the survey and the limited 
overlap in responses over the three years. We tried to address the issue of self-reports by asking principals 
and teachers factual questions about the type and level of change they implemented over the last year. The 
low response rates were taken into account when defining the longitudinal sample for analysis and 
choosing random effects models with maximum likelihood estimation to estimate missing responses. 
 
These random effect models allowed us to look at changes over time as reported by principals and 
teachers in schools in the ‘basic’ and ‘weak/very weak’ inspection categories. The results suggest that 
school inspections particularly have an impact on principals, and not so much teachers. Although due to 
the necessity to average teacher responses within each time point for each school, it was always going to 
be more difficult for differences to reach significance in the teacher sample. Principals in all schools 
indicate that school inspections set expectations in the first year after the early warning analysis, but 
declining scores for all schools suggest that this effect levels off in later years. Schools in the ‘basic’ 
inspection category accept significantly more feedback in the first year after the early warning analyses, 
compared to schools in the ‘weak/very weak’ category; acceptance of feedback however increases over 
the three years for schools in the ‘weak/very weak’ category while it remains relatively stable for schools 
in the ‘basic’ inspection category. There is a strong correlation between acceptance of feedback and 
setting of expectations in the first year after the early warning analysis, suggesting that schools that 
incorporate inspection standards also accept more inspection feedback.  
 
It was also found that stakeholders from schools in the ‘basic’ category were sensitive to inspection 
reports in the first year after the categorization of the school, while they do not seem to use reports 
anymore in subsequent years. Schools in the ‘weak/very weak’ inspection category do not report changes 
in stakeholders’ sensitivity to inspection reports.  
 
Schools in the two categories did not report differences in the level of improvements of effective school 
and teaching conditions or differences in the level of improvement capacity and school effectiveness. We 
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also found very little differences between schools in the ‘basic’ and ‘weak/very weak’ inspection 
categories in unintended consequences of inspections, although principals in ‘weak/very weak schools’ 
more often report of sending documents that represent a more positive picture of the school to the 
Inspectorate. Teachers in ‘weak/very weak’ schools however also report of less narrowing of the 
curriculum compared to teachers in schools in the basic inspection category.  
Schools in the ‘basic’ category show a decline in their improvement of self-evaluations, while ‘weak/very 
weak’ schools increase their efforts in the first two years after the early warning analysis, but return back 
to normal in year 3. Schools in the ‘weak/very weak’ category also improve their capacity in the first two 
years after the categorization of the school, while schools in the ‘basic’ category remain relatively stable 
over time.  
The results from the path model indicate that improvements in self-evaluations lead to increased activity 
in improvement of the effectiveness of the school and in improving the school’s capacity in the following 
year. These improvement actions however did not lead (according to principals) to a more effective 
school or to more capacity to improve in the school.  
 
These results lead to four main conclusions:  
 First, the results indicate different mechanisms of potential impact for schools in different inspection 
categories: potential improvement from school inspections in the ‘basic’ inspection category seems to 
result from the setting of expectations and the preparation and improvement of self-evaluations, 
openness to inspection feedback and sensitivity of stakeholders to inspection reports in the year of, 
and after the early warning analysis. Weak and very weak schools show a pattern of impact through 
an increase in openness to, and acceptance of inspection feedback and increasing changes in the 
schools’ self-evaluations and capacity-building over the years.  
 Second, school inspections seem to primarily have an impact on principals and not so much on 
teachers. 
 Third, the results indicate that the actual impact on improved school and teaching conditions is 
limited. However, as such effects are more likely to take effect after a longer period of time than the 
three years of data collection, these improvements may potentially be out of the scope of the study.  
 Fourth, we find little unintended consequences from school inspections. Only principals in 
‘weak/very weak schools’ report of sending documents that present a more positive picture of the 
school to principals.  
 Finally, the lack of any correlation between accepting feedback, setting expectations and stakeholder 
sensitivity on the one hand and improvement actions in the schools on the other hand also suggests 
that impact of school inspections is not a linear process, but operates through diffuse and cyclical 
processes of change.  
 
This paper is an initial attempt to highlight the types of processes that underlie such complex and 
interrelated mechanisms of impact of school inspections, suggesting that school inspection models can be 
improved when policy-makers develop models that impact on the teaching level (e.g. through an 
evaluation of, and feedback about the quality of teaching), and thinking of broader mechanisms of impact 
through norm-setting and dissemination of good practices.  
 
Evidence from school effectiveness studies supports such a focus and provides further suggestions on the 
conditions of impact that Inspectorates of Education should focus on, as well as the research models to 
use in analysing such an impact. Creemers and Kyriakides’ (2008) and Sammons et al (2011) dynamic 
model of educational effectiveness for example shows how effective schooling is a dynamic process 
where conditions of school effectiveness operate on different levels (student, class, school organization 
and school context) and where the relations between those levels and the interplay between the conditions 
of effective schools on those levels is often curvilinear; e.g. a minimal level of knowledge is necessary for 
teachers to be effective, but beyond a certain point, a negative relation occurs. A similar approach is 
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needed for the study of the impact of school inspections, using a dynamic model to analyse the 
improvement from inspections and for example look at the trajectories of change in schools in different 
inspection categories. Equally, Inspectorates of Education should allow their inspection frameworks to be 
more flexible and adaptive to the context in which schools function and their trajectory of improvement.  
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Table 1 Target sample and response rates, principals and teachers combined 
 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 All 3 years 
Target Sample Response rates Response rates Response rates Response rates 
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
411 359 Number of 
responses: 
213 
 
Number of 
schools: 96 
Number of 
responses: 
100 
 
Number of 
schools: 40 
 
Number of 
responses: 
339 
 
Number of 
schools: 
166 
Number of 
responses: 
251 
 
Number of 
schools: 
100 
Number of 
responses: 
199 
 
Number of 
schools: 
117 
Number of 
responses: 
181 
 
Number of 
schools: 95 
Number of 
responses: 751 
 
Number of 
schools 
responding once: 
148 
 
Number of 
schools 
responding twice: 
79 
 
Number of 
schools 
responding three 
times: 24 
 
Total number of 
schools: 251 
Number of 
responses: 532 
 
Number of 
schools 
responding once: 
113 
 
Number of 
schools 
responding 
twice: 40 
 
Number of 
schools 
responding three 
times: 16 
 
Total number of 
schools: 161 
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Table 2. Target sample and response rates principals and teachers primary education according to inspection category 
 
 Primary education 
  Response rate principals   Response rate teachers 
 Target sample of schools 
(percentage of target 
population) 
Year 1 Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Target sample of teachers 
(percentage of target 
population: 1 teacher 
group 3, 5 and 8) 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 3 
Schools assigned to basic 
inspection category 
208 (3.10%) 46 77 59 624 (1.86%) 50 66 70 
Schools assigned to ‘weak 
schools’ inspection category 
152 (41.53%) 23 37 9 456 (24.92%) 24 29 5 
Schools assigned to ‘very 
weak schools’ inspection 
category 
51 (83.61%) 2 9 1 153 (50.16%) 4 8 0 
Total 411 (6.19%) 71 123 69 1233 (3.70%) 78 103 75 
 
Table 3. Target sample and response rates principals and teachers secondary education according to inspection category 
 
 Secondary education 
 Target sample of schools 
(percentage of target 
population) 
Response rate 
principals 
Target sample 
(percentage of target 
population: 4 teachers in 
each department) 
Response rate teachers 
 HAVO VWO Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
HAVO VWO Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 3 
Schools assigned to basic 
inspection category 
321 
(77.16%) 
262 (73.39%) 12 53 47 1284 
(15.43%) 
1048 
(14.68%) 
31 68 51 
Schools assigned to ‘weak 
schools’ inspection category 
33 (100%) 91 (100%) 0 0 3 132 (20%) 364 (20%) 2 3 2 
Schools assigned to ‘very 
weak schools’ inspection 
category 
5 (100%) 6 (100%) 1 1 0 20 (20%) 24 (20%) 1 1 1 
Total 359 
(79.10%) 
359 (79.10%) 13 54 50 1436 
(15.81%) 
1436 
(51.81%) 
34 72 54 
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Table 4. Full list of coefficients for longitudinal path model; direct effects  
 
Direct Effects Estimate S.E z  p Standardised coefficient 
selfevaly2 <-         
setexpy1 0.08 0.26 0.33 0.75 0.08 
insarry1 -0.27 0.31 -0.85 0.39 -0.18 
insarry2 0.53 0.23 2.27 0.02 0.37 
accfeedy1 -0.01 0.32 -0.03 0.98 -0.01 
stakeholy1 -0.03 0.40 -0.08 0.94 -0.02 
  
chschooleffy2 <-         
selfevaly2 0.46 0.08 5.64 0.00 0.57 
setexpy1 0.04 0.19 0.19 0.85 0.04 
insarry1 0.15 0.22 0.67 0.51 0.13 
insarry2 -0.07 0.17 -0.43 0.67 -0.06 
accfeedy1 0.09 0.23 0.39 0.70 0.09 
stakeholy1 0.03 0.28 0.11 0.91 0.02 
  
changecapbuildy2 <-         
selfevaly2 0.36 0.10 3.81 0.00 0.42 
setexpy1 0.06 0.19 0.35 0.73 0.07 
insarry1 0.45 0.22 2.00 0.05 0.35 
insarry2 -0.06 0.18 -0.37 0.72 -0.05 
accfeedy1 0.32 0.23 1.42 0.16 0.29 
stakeholy1 0.38 0.28 1.36 0.18 0.27 
  
capbuildy3 <-         
selfevaly2 -0.26 0.17 -1.53 0.13 -0.32 
chschooleffy2 0.24 0.21 1.16 0.25 0.24 
changecapbuildy2 -0.22 0.17 -1.35 0.18 -0.24 
insarry1 -0.09 0.17 -0.54 0.59 -0.08 
insarry2 0.38 0.18 2.03 0.04 0.33 
  
schooleffy3 <-         
selfevaly2 0.05 0.18 0.31 0.76 0.06 
chschooleffy2 0.17 0.21 0.83 0.41 0.15 
changecapbuildy2 -0.49 0.16 -2.96 0.00 -0.46 
capbuildy3 0.34 0.13 2.55 0.01 0.30 
insarry1 0.24 0.17 1.37 0.17 0.18 
insarry2 0.36 0.19 1.87 0.06 0.28 
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Table 5. Full list of coefficients for longitudinal path model; indirect effects 
 
 
Indirect effects 
Estimate S.E z  p Standardised coefficient 
chschooleffy2 <-         
setexpy1 0.04 0.12 0.33 0.74 0.05 
insarry1 -0.12 0.15 -0.84 0.40 -0.10 
insarry2 0.24 0.12 2.06 0.04 0.21 
accfeedy1 0.00 0.15 -0.03 0.98 0.00 
stakeholy1 -0.01 0.18 -0.08 0.94 -0.01 
  
changecapbuildy2 <-         
setexpy1 0.03 0.09 0.32 0.75 0.03 
insarry1 -0.10 0.12 -0.79 0.43 -0.08 
insarry2 0.19 0.11 1.74 0.08 0.16 
accfeedy1 0.00 0.12 -0.03 0.98 0.00 
stakeholy1 -0.01 0.15 -0.08 0.94 -0.01 
  
capbuildy3 <-         
selfevaly2 0.03 0.02 1.17 0.24 0.03 
setexpy1 -0.03 0.07 -0.37 0.71 -0.03 
insarry1 0.00 0.12 -0.03 0.98 0.00 
insarry2 -0.13 0.09 -1.33 0.19 -0.11 
accfeedy1 -0.05 0.10 -0.50 0.62 -0.05 
stakeholy1 -0.07 0.12 -0.59 0.55 -0.05 
  
schooleffy3 <-         
selfevaly2 -0.18 0.08 -2.29 0.02 -0.19 
chschooleffy2 0.08 0.07 1.16 0.25 0.07 
changecapbuildy2 -0.08 0.06 -1.35 0.18 -0.07 
setexpy1 -0.04 0.10 -0.38 0.71 -0.04 
insarry1 -0.21 0.16 -1.34 0.18 -0.16 
insarry2 0.08 0.14 0.58 0.56 0.06 
accfeedy1 -0.16 0.13 -1.18 0.24 -0.14 
stakeholy1 -0.20 0.16 -1.24 0.22 -0.13 
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Table 6. Full list of coefficients for longitudinal path model; total effects 
 
Total Effects Estimate S.E z  p Standardised coefficient 
selfevaly2 <-         
setexpy1 0.08 0.26 0.33 0.75 0.08 
insarry1 -0.27 0.31 -0.85 0.39 -0.18 
insarry2 0.53 0.23 2.27 0.02 0.37 
accfeedy1 -0.01 0.32 -0.03 0.98 -0.01 
stakeholy1 -0.03 0.40 -0.08 0.94 -0.02 
            
chschooleffy2 <-         
selfevaly2 0.46 0.08 5.64 0.00 0.57 
setexpy1 0.07 0.25 0.30 0.77 0.09 
insarry1 0.03 0.29 0.09 0.93 0.02 
insarry2 0.17 0.21 0.79 0.43 0.15 
accfeedy1 0.08 0.30 0.28 0.78 0.08 
stakeholy1 0.02 0.38 0.04 0.97 0.01 
            
changecapbuildy2 <-         
selfevaly2 0.36 0.10 3.81 0.00 0.42 
setexpy1 0.10 0.21 0.46 0.65 0.10 
insarry1 0.35 0.25 1.42 0.16 0.28 
insarry2 0.13 0.20 0.65 0.52 0.10 
accfeedy1 0.32 0.26 1.23 0.22 0.29 
stakeholy1 0.37 0.32 1.16 0.25 0.26 
            
capbuildy3 <-         
selfevaly2 -0.23 0.17 -1.35 0.18 -0.29 
chschooleffy2 0.24 0.21 1.16 0.25 0.24 
changecapbuildy2 -0.22 0.17 -1.35 0.18 -0.24 
setexpy1 -0.03 0.07 -0.37 0.71 -0.03 
insarry1 -0.09 0.19 -0.48 0.63 -0.08 
insarry2 0.25 0.19 1.35 0.18 0.22 
accfeedy1 -0.05 0.10 -0.50 0.62 -0.05 
stakeholy1 -0.07 0.12 -0.59 0.55 -0.05 
            
schooleffy3 <-         
selfevaly2 -0.12 0.19 -0.64 0.52 -0.13 
chschooleffy2 0.25 0.22 1.16 0.24 0.23 
changecapbuildy2 -0.56 0.17 -3.25 0.00 -0.53 
capbuildy3 0.34 0.13 2.55 0.01 0.30 
setexpy1 -0.04 0.10 -0.38 0.71 -0.04 
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insarry1 0.03 0.22 0.12 0.90 0.02 
insarry2 0.44 0.20 2.17 0.03 0.34 
accfeedy1 -0.16 0.13 -1.18 0.24 -0.14 
stakeholy1 -0.20 0.16 -1.24 0.22 -0.13 
 
